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Gambling for the Good, Trading for the
Future:  The Legality of Markets in
Science Claims
Tom W. Bell*
I. INTRODUCTION
Good ideas do not always lead to legal acts.  Setting up a mar-
ket in science claims,1 for instance, certainly sounds like a good
idea.  Such a market could effectively open a shortcut to the fu-
ture, giving us the means to answer crucial scientific questions
more quickly, accurately, and cheaply than we can at present.
Notwithstanding their salient benefits, however, U.S. law does not
clearly approve of markets in science claims.  They do not fit
neatly into any category created by common law, statute, or regu-
lation, and their legal status remains untested by the courts.  This
article aims to dispel some of the legal uncertainty surrounding
markets in science claims and thus to help chart a path toward
their implementation.2
Given that they remain almost wholly untried, and thus
largely unknown, Part II offers a concise introduction to markets
in science claims.  Part III then compares the transactions sup-
ported by such a market with their closest analogs in extant U.S.
law:  gambling and commodity futures trading.3  That comparison
finds the policies behind such laws generally more sympathetic to
markets in science claims than the laws themselves, though even
the latter offer some hope.  Nonetheless, recognizing that some
* Associate Professor, Chapman University School of Law.  B.A., with Honors, Uni-
versity of Kansas; M.A., University of Southern California; J.D., University of Chicago.  I
thank Robin Hanson, Ken Kittlitz, Denis Binder, and Stuart Benjamin for commenting on
drafts of the paper; Carl A. Royal, esq., for sharing his knowledge of commodity futures
law; and Donna G. Matias for editorial comments.  Copyright 2001, Tom W. Bell.  All rights
reserved.
1 In very brief, a “science claim” constitutes a statement provable within a specified
and finite period of time by authoritative means.  For details, see infra Part II.
2 By way of full disclosure, I note that I have an interest in seeing markets in science
claims made legal because I would like to see one established in honor of the late Dr. Julian
L. Simon.  Toward that end, I have won the permission of his widow, Dr. Rita A. Simon, to
research the possibility of creating the Simon Market in Science Claims. See generally The
Simon Market in Science Claims, Quantifying the Current Consensus, at http://
www.simonmarket.org (last visited Jan. 11, 2002).
3 This article concerns only the law of the United States, though of course some gen-
eral observations may well hold true of the law of other countries.
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people refuse to let bad laws stand in the way of good acts, Part IV
considers a few alternative strategies for implementing fully func-
tional, if somewhat less than fully public or legal, markets in sci-
ence claims.
II. THE WHY AND WHAT OF MARKETS IN SCIENCE CLAIMS
Scientific progress has given us increasingly healthy,
wealthy, and well-informed lives.4  A chorus of critics, however,
warns that our modern lifestyles threaten to repay us with night-
mares such as rising sea levels, genetically engineered monsters,
and nano-terrorism.5  Doomsayers often err on the dramatic side,
of course.  Paul Ehrlich once predicted, for instance, that the
human race would run out of food by the year 1977.6  But the press
loves a good horror story, legislators cannot ignore public fears,
and none of us can risk misjudging a potential disaster.  How,
then, can we accurately resolve public policy questions that turn
on disputed scientific claims?
Current means of publicly debating science questions do not
work very well.  The mass media too often dish up sensationalized
and overly simplified reports.  Official investigations move slowly,
rely on “official” opinions, and favor mushy committee-speak over
hard truths.  Studies produced by think tanks and policy insti-
tutes raise questions of bias.7  Clearly, we need a better mecha-
nism for resolving scientific disputes.
A better mechanism would ideally give honest, accurate, and
timely answers to complex scientific questions.  It would generate
a precise numerical measurement of the current expert consensus
about any given issue.  Far from elitist, it would reward innova-
tive and accurate predictions from any and all sources.  Such an
epistemic mechanism would look still better if it stimulated public
interest in scientific and technological issues, generated its own
funding, and lay ready at hand.  Markets in science claims, a type
of “idea futures” market, offer just such a means of tackling diffi-
cult and important questions.8
4 In the interest of brevity, “science” herein covers both the theoretical and applied—
or what might be called “technological”—aspects of science.
5 See, e.g., Bill Joy, Why the Future Doesn’t Need Us, WIRED, Apr. 2000, available at
http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/8.04/joy.html.
6 See PAUL R. EHRLICH, THE POPULATION BOMB 36-40 (1968).
7 Such questions arise because think tanks and policy institutes typically rely on con-
tinuing contributions from their supporters, most of whom expect such organizations to
favor particular points of view.
8 Robin Hanson apparently coined the term “idea futures” and has written several
groundbreaking papers on markets in such instruments. See, e.g., Robin Hanson, Could
Gambling Save Science? Encouraging an Honest Consensus, SOC. EPISTEMOLOGY, Jan.
1995, at 3, available at http://hanson.gmu.edu/gamble.html [hereinafter Hanson, Could
Gambling Save Science?]; Robin D. Hanson, Decision Markets, IEEE INTELLIGENT SYSTEMS,
May/June 1999, at 16, available at http://hanson.gmu.edu/decisionmarkets.pdf [hereinafter
2002] Gambling for the Good, Trading for the Future 161
I will here briefly outline the features of such a market in sci-
ence claims by way of a simple example, drawing heavily on the
work of Professor Robin Hanson.9  Although drawing analogies to
gambling and futures trading helps to explain how such markets
function, careful readers should resist letting those pedagogical
tools unduly sway them.  As argued in Part III, the type of market
in science claims described here differs in some important re-
spects—important legal respects—from gambling or futures trad-
ing.  It also bears keeping in mind that the following example
keeps details fairly thin and prices unrealistically low in the inter-
est of simplicity.
Suppose that you have a theory, highly unorthodox but well
reasoned and consistent with the available evidence, about the
correlation between heat waves and earthquakes.10  Not having an
advanced degree in geophysics or a reputation in the field, you
find it hard for anyone to take your theory seriously.  To demon-
strate your confidence—and perhaps turn a profit in the process—
you turn to a market in science claims.
First, you carefully word your claim to say, in essence, that
within twenty years the professional geophysical community will
have embraced your theory.  You call your claim “HeatQuake” and
name an impartial, authoritative third party to judge the claim on
its own terms five years hence.  Next, you have the science mar-
ket’s bank print a matched pair of coupons, one marked “Heat-
Quake true = $1,” the other, “HeatQuake false = $1.”  As those
labels indicate, the holder of the first coupon can redeem it at the
issuing bank for $1 if and when the HeatQuake claim proves true,
whereas the holder of the second can do likewise should Heat-
Quake prove false.  The bank sells you the pair of coupons for $1,
Hanson, Decision Markets]; Robin Hanson, Idea Futures: Encouraging an Honest Consen-
sus, EXTROPY, Winter 1991-92, at 7, available at http://hanson.gmu.edu/ifextropy.html
[hereinafter Hanson, Encouraging an Honest Consensus]; Robin Hanson, Idea Futures:
How Making Wagers on the Future Can Make It Happen Faster, WIRED, Sept. 1995, at 125,
available at http://hanson.gmu.edu/ifwired.html; Robin Hanson, Shall We Vote on Values,
But Bet on Beliefs? (2000) (unpublished working paper, George Mason University, Depart-
ment of Economics), available at http://hanson.gmu.edu/futurachy.pdf [hereinafter Han-
son, Vote on Values].
I use “markets in science claims” herein because I intend to discuss a market hosting
only those sorts of claims that will give it the best case for legality, whereas Hanson de-
scribes “idea futures markets” largely in functional terms, without barring them from host-
ing claims more likely to fall within the scope of gambling or commodity futures trading
laws.
9 For Hanson’s website devoted to such markets, see Robin Hanson, Idea Futures, at
http://hanson.gmu.edu/ideafutures.html (last visited Jan. 5, 2002), and Robin Hanson, Idea
Futures Publications, at http://hanson.gmu.edu/ifpubs.html#Hanson (last visited Jan. 5,
2002), for a collection of related writings.
10 The example comes from Guo Ziqi et al., Spatial Detect Technology Applied on
Earthquake’s Impending Forecast (Nov. 5-9, 2001) (paper presented at the 22d Asian Con-
ference on Remote Sensing), available at http://www.crisp.nus.edu.sg/~acrs2001/pdf/
192Guo.pdf.
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calculating that because the claim cannot turn out to be both true
and false, it will only have to pay off one of the two coupons.
Finally, you launch trading on the HeatQuake claim by offer-
ing to sell the “HeatQuake false” claim on the science market for
$.75.  You keep the “HeatQuake true” coupon, looking forward to
redeeming it later.  In contrast, a professional geophysicist who
hears about your offer, and thinks your theory ridiculous, snaps
up the “HeatQuake false” coupon with the thought that she will
redeem it and make an easy $.25 on the deal.  At that point, your
HeatQuake (true) claim trades at $.25 per coupon, showing that
those playing the market regard your theory as twenty-five per-
cent plausible.
That price-per-coupon does not yet mean much, of course, be-
cause only one coupon has swapped hands.  But soon other profes-
sional geophysicists want to get in on what they regard as a sure
deal.  So you return to the bank, buy more coupon pairs, and sell
“HeatQuake false” coupons to those skeptics as well.  Their de-
mand convinces you to raise the price of “HeatQuake false” to $.84
per coupon, and then to $.96 per coupon.  In fact, demand grows so
great that you can no longer afford to buy new coupon pairs from
the bank.  Fortunately, speculators, intrigued both by the extreme
odds and by a paper about your theory that you have published on
your webpage, join your side of the betting, increasing the mar-
ket’s capitalization and pushing HeatQuake’s price up from its
$.04 per coupon low to $.12 per coupon.  At that point trading
slows, your critics having spent as much as they dare and the
speculators on your side unwilling to risk more money on behalf of
your theory.
A few months later, however, a Taiwanese researcher pub-
lishes a study showing a statistically significant correlation be-
tween heat waves and earthquakes.  Some of your former
adversaries become anxious upon hearing the news and offer to
sell their “HeatQuake false” claims at a slight loss.  That moves
HeatQuake’s price to $.19 per coupon, thus reflecting a new as-
sessment of your theory.  More favorable research issues and the
price moves again, and so on and so forth, HeatQuake’s value at
any given time quantifying the consensus of all who back up their
opinions with money.
This example skimps on many interesting details, as noted
above, and a few very important ones.  Readers should refer to
Hanson’s writing for both more complete descriptions of “idea fu-
tures” markets, of which markets in science claims constitute a
type, and for point-counterpoint treatment of many possible objec-
tions.  Hanson’s work also describes the many advantages to such
markets: they quantify the current consensus about complicated
issues quickly, cheaply, and accurately; they reward valuable in-
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formation no matter where it comes from; they force wildly inaccu-
rate or under-informed pundits to “put up or shut up”; they
generate public interest in current scientific disputes; they allow
parties affected by the topics covered in science claims to hedge
against risk; they require no taxes but instead can fund them-
selves; and, as the following examples show, they could start oper-
ating tomorrow.11
Although no fully functioning market in science claims cur-
rently exists, various play-money versions and real-money ana-
logs offer illuminating examples.  The Foresight Exchange,12 a
play-money market designed to test Hanson’s theories, has been
operating on the World Wide Web since 1994.13  It includes hard
science claims (such as CFsn, which predicts the success of cold
fusion),14 humane science claims (such as F-Pres, which predicts
the United States will have a female president before 2014),15 and
fun claims (such as King, which predicts that Prince Charles will
be crowned the King of England).16  A handful of other web-based
markets, because they function more like popularity contests than
measures of objective criteria, prove somewhat less instructive.
These markets include the Hollywood Stock Exchange, on which
players use “Hollywood Dollars” to trade “shares” of actors, mov-
ies, and music artists;17 PolitiStock, on which players use “PolitiS-
11 See supra note 8.
12 Foresight Exchange Prediction Market, at http://www.ideosphere.com/fx/main.html
(last visited Jan. 26, 2002).  For a one-time alternative to the Foresight Exchange that has
recently stopped active operation, see The U.S. Idea Futures Exchange, at http://
www.usifex.com (last visited Jan. 26, 2002).
13 Robin Hanson et al., The Story of the Idea Futures Web Site, at http://han-
son.gmu.edu/if-prix.html (last visited Jan. 26, 2002).
14 Foresight Exchange Prediction Market, Claim CFsn - Cold Fusion, at http://
www.ideosphere.com/fx-bin/Claim?claim=CFsn (last visited Apr. 1, 2002).  As of April 1,
2002, CFsn traded at twelve units, indicating a current consensus that the claim has a
twelve percent likelihood of proving true. Id.
15 Foresight Exchange Prediction Market, Claim F_Pres - Female President Before
2014, at http://www.ideosphere.com/fx-bin/Claim?claim=F_Pres (last visited Apr. 1, 2002).
As of April 1, 2002, F_Pres traded at forty-one units. Id.
16 Foresight Exchange Prediction Market, Claim King - Prince Charles Remains Heir,
at http://www.ideosphere.com/fx-bin/Claim?claim=King (last visited Apr. 1, 2002).  As of
April 1, 2002, King traded at eighty-three units. Id.
17 Hollywood Stock Exchange, at http://www.hsx.com/ (last visited Jan. 6, 2002).  It
bears noting, however, that the value of some items traded on the Hollywood Stock Ex-
change (such as MovieStocks) relates directly to an objective measure (such as box-office
receipts). See Hollywood Stock Exchange, Glossary, at http://www.hsx.com/help/glossary/
(last visited Mar. 26, 2002); see also Laura Pedersen-Pietersen, The Hollywood Stock Mar-
ket: You Can’t Lose, J. REC. (Okla. City, Okla.), Jan. 13, 1998, available at 1998 WL
11956867 (“HSX is designing a system in which its traders can invest real money in film
projects.  Keiser [one of HSX’s creators] said the idea, which is geared to cash-hungry inde-
pendent film producers rather than big studios, will soon be before the SEC for approval.”).
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tock softMoney” to do much the same with politicians;18 and Wall
Street Sports, which targets athletes for similar treatment.19
Thanks to the proverbial distinction between talking and
walking, no market limited to mere play-money can fully dupli-
cate the incentives generated by a market using real money.  The
Iowa Electronic Markets (IEM) offers the best example of the lat-
ter.20  The IEM offers a real-money on-line futures market where
real-world events, most notably the outcomes of political elections,
determine contract payoffs.21  Even though the IEM limits ac-
counts to five hundred dollars,22 it has proven more accurate, on
average, than polls in predicting election results.23
Unfortunately, for all its help as an example of what a market
in science claims might accomplish, the IEM offers little help in
clarifying the law generally applicable to real-money idea futures
markets.  As discussed below, IEM operates by the grace of a spe-
cial “no action” letter issued by the Commodities Futures Trading
Commission (CFTC), which states “that as long as the IEM con-
forms to certain guidelines, the CFTC will take no action against
it.”24  Even if it wanted similar treatment, a market in science
claims could not count on getting it.25  Absent that one lucid state-
ment by the CFTC, however, and as Part III reveals next, U.S. law
does not speak clearly for or against markets in science claims.
III. THE UNCERTAIN LEGAL STATUS OF MARKETS IN
SCIENCE CLAIMS
With regard to each area of law discussed in this Part, theory
proves more forgiving than practice.  The policy goals that justify
banning all but a few carefully circumscribed forms of gambling
and commodity futures trading do not convincingly justify placing
identical constraints on a market in science claims.  But the laws
18 See PolitiStock, The Political Stock Exchange, at http://www.politistock.com/ (last
visited Jan. 26, 2002); see also PolitiStock, PolitiStock FAQ, What is softMoney?, at http://
www.politistock.com/about/faq.shtml#whatissoftmoney (last visited Mar. 26, 2002).
19 See Wall Street Sports, at http://www.wallstreetsports.com/ (last visited Jan. 26,
2002).
20 See IEM, Iowa Electronic Markets, at http://www.biz.uiowa.edu/iem/ (last visited
Jan. 26, 2002).
21 See IEM, Iowa Electronic Markets, Frequently Asked Questions, at http://
www.biz.uiowa.edu/iem/faq.html (last visited Jan. 7, 2002).
22 See IEM, Iowa Electronic Markets, IEM Basics, Applying for an Account, at http://
www.biz.uiowa.edu/iem/trmanual/IEMManual_1.html (last visited Jan. 26, 2002) [herein-
after IEM, Applying for an Account].
23 See IEM, Iowa Electronic Markets, Previous Market Performance (Graphs), IEM
Accuracy Compared to Polls, at http://www.biz.uiowa.edu/iem/media/previous.html (last
visited Jan. 26, 2002).
24 IEM, Iowa Electronic Markets, Frequently Asked Questions, Is It Legal?, at http://
www.biz.uiowa.edu/iem/faq.html (last visited Jan. 26, 2002) [hereinafter IEM, Is It Legal?].
25 See discussion infra Part III.B.2.
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passed to enforce those policy goals, evidently not having been
written with a science claim market in mind, risk crushing it.
A. Science Claims as Gambling
Although a market in science claims would come close to qual-
ifying as a gaming service, it would arguably differ from tradi-
tional types of gambling on both legal and policy grounds.  The
legal question presents the closest shave because answering it re-
quires a somewhat metaphysical—and therefore uncertain—in-
quiry into whether chance predominates over skill in predicting
the outcome of scientific disputes.  The policy question proves less
problematic, since none of the reasons for outlawing or heavily
regulating gaming appear to apply to markets in science claims.
This section discusses each question in turn.
1. Gaming Law
Although gaming remains largely the province of state law,26
which varies from state to state, the common law generally re-
quires proof of three elements to establish the existence of a gam-
bling transaction:  prize, chance, and consideration.27  The first
and third elements would indisputably apply to a fully functioning
26 Although several federal statutes apply to gambling, they typically rely on state
law for substantive definitions. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1955(b)(1)(i) (2000) (defining “illegal
gambling business” as one in “violation of the law of a State or political subdivision in
which it is conducted”); see also Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
(RICO), id. § 1961(6) (defining “unlawful debt” in part by reference to state gambling laws);
Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 25 U.S.C. § 2703(7)(A)(ii) (1995) (defining “class II gaming”
in terms of state law).  Other federal statutes assess criminality based on state gambling
laws. See, e.g., Transportation of Gambling Devices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1172(a) (1997) (ex-
empting from illegality transport of gambling devices to any state or state subdivision that
has legalized the gambling device in question); Interstate Horseracing Act of 1978, id.
§ 3002(3) (defining “interstate off-track wager” in terms of state law); Wire Transfer Act, 18
U.S.C. § 1084(a) (making illegal under federal law the use of interstate telecommunications
facilities for placing wagers illegal in either the sender or recipient’s state); Charity Games
Advertising Clarification Act of 1988, id. § 1301 (excusing from illegality interstate trans-
port of lottery tickets permitted by authorities of affected states); Racketeering Act, id.
§ 1953(b) (excusing from illegality interstate transport of wagering paraphernalia if legal
under state law).
27 Ronald J. Rychlak, The Introduction of Casino Gambling: Public Policy and the
Law, 64 MISS. L.J. 291, 294 (1995); Roland J. Santoni, An Introduction to Nebraska Gam-
ing Law, 29 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1123, 1129 (1996); see also State v. One Hundred & Fifty-
Eight Gaming Devices, 499 A.2d 940, 951 (Md. 1985) (describing three elements of gam-
bling as “consideration, chance and reward”); State v. One ‘Jack and Jill’ Pinball Machine,
224 S.W.2d 854, 860 (Mo. Ct. App. 1949) (“(1) consideration or risk, (2) chance and (3)
reward or prize”); Commonwealth v. Two Electronic Poker Game Machines, 465 A.2d 973,
977 (Pa. 1983) (“consideration, a result determined by chance rather than skill, and a
reward”).
States also criminalize or regulate by statute a wide variety of games of chance. See,
e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 330b (West 2001) (outlawing slot machines).  They do not, however,
frown on games of skill as a general matter. See, e.g.,  id. § 330b(4) (exempting “predomi-
nately games of skill” from scope of statute).  No state appears to have specifically targeted
idea futures markets for the same treatment they have given, say, poker.
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market in science claims.  With regard to the prize element, a
market participant would profit after having beat others in pre-
dicting the outcome of any particular controversy.  Indeed, the
prospect of such a prize, together with the bragging rights that
come with it, serves as a vital incentive to draw players, and the
information they bring with them, into the market.  With regard
to the consideration element, a market participant would have to
buy into one side of a particular claim, via purchase of a “yes” or
“no” coupon, in order to qualify for the prize.
Whether a market in science claims would qualify as a gam-
bling service thus turns on the second of the three elements:
chance.  Here, the law grows murky.  It cannot be that any ele-
ment of chance, when combined with prize and consideration, suf-
fices to create a gambling transaction; otherwise the most routine
sort of business would likewise qualify.  Even annuities, treasury
bonds, and certificates of deposit, though they qualify as safe in-
vestments, present some risk of loss.  So goes life.28  The question
thus becomes:  how much chance does it take to qualify a transac-
tion as gambling?
Authorities generally agree that under U.S. law, gambling
arises when chance predominates over skill or knowledge in deter-
mining whether one who has offered consideration wins a prize in
return.29  It is hard to specify, in the abstract and in general, how
a market in science claims would fare under that test.  Partici-
pants in a such a market—especially successful ones—would no
doubt aver that they rely far more on talent than chance, and it
does seem plausible that intelligence and education would deter-
mine who wins most claims.  The notion that relatively ignorant
participants might unwisely rely on luck when trading on the
market would not prove the contrary.  As the California Court of
Appeals has explained, “It is the character of the game rather
than a particular player’s skill or lack of it that determines
whether the game is one of chance or skill.”30
28 For a delightfully philosophical judicial disquisition on the matter, see United
States v. McDonald, 59 F. 563, 565-66 (N.D. Ill. 1893).
29 See Johnson v. Phinney, 218 F.2d 303, 306 (5th Cir. 1955) (“With respect to the
element of chance, the authorities are in general agreement that if such element is present
and predominates in the determination of a winner, the fact that players may exercise
varying degrees of skill is immaterial; and the game or device is a lottery.”); Opinion of the
Justices, 795 So.2d 630, 635-36 (Ala. 2001) (collecting authorities elucidating the “Ameri-
can Rule,” under which a scheme is a lottery if chance is the dominant factor in determin-
ing the result of the game even if skill or knowledge plays some role); Finster v. Keller, 96
Cal. Rptr. 241, 246 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971) (“The test is not whether the game contains an
element of chance or an element of skill, but which of them is the dominating factor in
determining the result of the game.”). But see United States v. Rich, 90 F. Supp. 624, 629-
30 (E.D. Ill. 1950) (finding bookmaking scheme not a lottery, gift enterprise, or similar
scheme under federal law on grounds, “there is always present something more than a
mere guess and there is nothing which resembles the distribution of prizes by lot”).
30 Finster, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 246.
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Nonetheless, the ultimate determination of whether chance
predominates over skill or knowledge would probably depend on
the science claim in question—and on the judge or jury making
that determination.  Consider the variety of claims currently at
play on the Foresight Exchange, a web-based play-money idea fu-
tures market.31  At one extreme fall claims like NDSen, which as-
serts that before 2012, there will be a U.S. Senator not affiliated
with either the Democratic or Republican parties,32 and Ms.A,
which asserts that before 2006, a woman will play in a profes-
sional major league sports game.33  Though they hardly pose the
same odds as roulette, winning those kinds of claims will require a
significant, and arguably a predominant, share of luck.  At the
other extreme fall claims like GBch and Neut.34  GBch asserts that
Goldbach’s Conjecture, which posits that every even number less
than three is the sum of two primes, will be settled by 2021.35
Neut asserts that the “rest mass of the electron neutrino is greater
than 0.01 eV in ordinary space.”36  A mathematician or theoretical
physicist could surely resolve those claims solely by dint of tal-
ent.37  Other claims fall at various points along the spectrum that
stretches from pure chance to pure skill.  The parties responsible
for operating a real-money idea futures market would face the dif-
ficult and somewhat risky job of categorizing which claims fall on
the gambling side of the law.
It thus remains uncomfortably uncertain whether an aggres-
sive prosecutor would allege that a market in science claims con-
stitutes gambling.  Although in recent decades gambling has won
legal status in an increasing number and variety of real-space lo-
31 See Foresight Exchange Prediction Market, supra note 12.
32 Foresight Exchange Prediction Market, Claim NDSen - Indie Senator by 2011, at
http://www.ideosphere.com/fx-bin/Claim?claim=NDSen (last visited Jan. 26, 2002).
33 Foresight Exchange Prediction Market, Claim Ms.A - Woman Major-Leaguer By 1/
1/06, at http://www.ideosphere.com/fx-bin/Claim?claim=Ms.A (last visited Jan. 26, 2002).
34 Foresight Exchange Prediction Market, Claim GBch - Goldbach Conjecture by
2020, at http://www.ideosphere.com/fx-bin/Claim?claim=GBch (last visited Jan. 29, 2002);
Foresight Exchange Prediction Market, Claim Neut - Neutrino Mass >0, at http://
www.ideosphere.com/fx-bin/Claim?claim=Neut (last visited Jan. 21, 2002).
35 Foresight Exchange Prediction Market, Claim GBch - Goldbach Conjecture by
2020, at http://www.ideosphere.com/fx-bin/Claim?claim=GBch (last visited Jan. 29, 2002).
36 Foresight Exchange Prediction Market, Claim Neut - Neutrino Mass >0, at http://
www.ideosphere.com/fx-bin/Claim?claim=Neut (last visited Jan. 26, 2002).  Physicists de-
fine an eV (electron-volt) as the kinetic energy acquired by an electron losing one volt of
potential. See About, Homework Help, Definition of Electron-Volt, at http://phys-
ics.about.com/library/dict/bldefelectronvolt.htm (last visited Mar. 26, 2002).
37 Indeed, one probably would have done so long ago were a sufficient amount of real
money at stake.  Again, it makes no legal difference whether some participants in the mar-
ket for such claims rely on luck rather than the expertise of a mathematician or physicist.
“It is the character of the game rather than a particular player’s skill or lack of it that
determines whether the game is one of chance or skill.”  Finster v. Keller, 96 Cal. Rptr. 241,
246 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971).
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cales38—albeit under very heavy regulatory burdens—that fact of-
fers scant solace to an enterprise that almost certainly would have
to operate over the Internet were it to operate effectively at all.39
Fortunately, courts, as a rule, interpret criminal statutes nar-
rowly.40  Regardless, the broad language of statutes that outlaw
gambling and the penalties that they impose41 might well give
pause to anyone interested in operating or entering a market in
science claims.
2. Gaming Policy
In contrast, it appears quite plain that a market in science
claims, as a matter of policy, would differ crucially from gambling
enterprises.  Lawmakers have outlawed or heavily regulated gam-
bling purportedly because it presents an avoidable risk42 of social
harm43 and offers few if any social benefits in return.44  None of
38 Rychlak, supra note 27, at 303 (“As more and more states seek to take advantage of
the enormous profits that can be derived from legalized gambling, new games, locations,
and variations have swept across the nation.”).
39 See discussion supra Part II (describing web-based operation of exemplar markets);
see also discussion infra Part III.A.2 (describing the policy concerns that generally fuel
suspicion of web-based operations versus real-space locales).
40 See United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 266 (1997) (“[T]he canon of strict con-
struction of criminal statutes, or rule of lenity, ensures fair warning by so resolving ambi-
guity in a criminal statute as to apply it only to conduct clearly covered.”).  This rule has
particular salience in cases presenting entirely new facts to a court, as would be true of a
court analyzing the legality of a market in science claims for the first time. Id. (“[D]ue
process bars courts from applying a novel construction of a criminal statute to conduct that
neither the statute nor any prior judicial decision has fairly disclosed to be within its scope
. . . .”).
41 See, for example, CAL. PENAL CODE § 337a (West 1999), specifying penalties for:
Every person, . . . [w]ho, whether for gain, hire, reward, or gratuitously, or other-
wise, at any time or place, records, or registers any bet or bets, wager or wagers,
upon the result, or purported result, of any . . . contest, or purported contest, of
skill . . . or upon the result, or purported result, of any lot, chance, casualty, un-
known or contingent event whatsoever; or . . . [w]ho lays, makes, offers or accepts
any bet or bets, or wager or wagers, upon the result, or purported result, of any . . .
contest, or purported contest, of skill . . . is punishable by imprisonment in the
county jail for a period of not more than one year or in the state prison.
Id.
42 Rychlak, supra note 27, at 298.  Early American colonists objected to gambling
largely because it represented a discretionary and wasteful diversion from more important
projects. Id.
43  E.g., John Warren Kindt, The Economic Impacts of Legalized Gambling Activities,
43 DRAKE L. REV. 51, 60-70 (1994) (relating evidence of social harm caused by legalized
gambling). But see ROGER DUNSTAN, GAMBLING IN CALIFORNIA IX-12 (1997) (“Any Attempt
to Quantify Social Costs is Highly Speculative”); Mike Roberts, The National Gambling
Debate: Two Defining Issues, 18 WHITTIER L. REV. 579, 590-99 (1997) (offering skeptical
review of claims about relationship between gambling and crime); id. at 599-608 (offering
skeptical review of claims about harms suffered by compulsive and underage gamblers).
44 See Kindt, supra note 43, at 51-60 (criticizing claims made on behalf of economic
benefits of legalized gambling); id. at 81-83 (criticizing claims that legalizing gambling cap-
tures taxes otherwise lost on illegal gambling activities). But see DUNSTAN, supra note 43,
ch. IX (analyzing economic benefits of legalized gambling, both generally and with particu-
lar regard to California).
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those three blameworthy features appear likely to attach to mar-
kets in science claims.
First, a market in science claims would not create risks solely
for the sake of entertainment; rather, it would aim to quantify un-
avoidable risks already present in the world.  In other words,
whereas a casino manufactures chance, a market in science claims
would merely report it.  Second, the dry subject matter and slow
pace of a market in science claims seems quite unlikely to en-
courage the sort of compulsive or underage gambling that worries
critics of the gaming industry.45  Third, and most important, a
market in science claims would offer significant social benefits.
The prices of its claims, because they would quantify current con-
sensus views about complex and often important scientific issues,
would constitute a positive externality capable of enriching the
understanding of interested laypeople, policy makers, and the
public at large.46  Whereas legalized gambling at best diverts us
from life’s woes and eases our taxes,47 markets in science claims
promise to help us see into the future.
B. Science Claims as Commodity Futures Trading
Several ramifications, most of them somewhat discouraging,
would follow if dealing in science claims qualified as commodity
futures trading subject to the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA),48
the federal statute that establishes the authority of the CFTC to
regulate such trading.  In that case, the parties who wanted to
start a market in science claims would either have to convince the
CFTC that they had surmounted the relevant—and hardly triv-
ial—regulatory hurdles or that the CFTC should grant them a
special exemption from regulation.49  Neither option would prove
easy, and failure to successfully pursue either would cast doubts
on the legality of any science claims market subject to the CEA.50
There remains a third option, however, that would raise relatively
45 See Hanson, Could Gambling Save Science?, supra note 8, at 11 (“[S]cience ques-
tions are generally too long term to be a problem, offering no more ‘action’ than long-term
stock investments.”).
46 See Hanson, Decision Markets, supra note 8, at 16-17.
47 See GUY CALVERT, GAMBLING AMERICA: BALANCING THE RISKS OF GAMBLING AND ITS
REGULATION (Cato Policy Analysis No. 349, 1999) (describing benefits of gambling).  Calvert
objects to state gaming monopolies, however, on grounds that they unfairly and inef-
ficiently shift tax burdens onto gamblers’ shoulders. Id. at 11.
48 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-27f (1999).
49 See discussion infra.
50 See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 2(a)(1)(A) (granting the CFTC exclusive jurisdiction over “ac-
counts, agreements . . . and transactions involving contracts of sale of a commodity for
future delivery, traded or executed” on markets subject to CFTC regulation); id. § 6(a) (pro-
viding that, absent an exemption by the CFTC, “it shall be unlawful for any person to . . .
[deal] in . . . a contract for the purchase or sale of a commodity for future delivery (other
than a contract which is made on or subject to the rules of a board of trade, exchange, or
market located outside the United States, its territories or possessions) unless” in connec-
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few legal difficulties:  instead of creating a freestanding special-
ized market, convince an exchange already regulated by the CFTC
to start listing science claims.  This section will explore each of
those three options in turn.  First, though, it must grapple with
the preliminary question of whether dealing in science claims in-
deed falls within the scope of the CEA.
1. Do Science Claims Fall Within the Scope of the CEA?
Would the transactions supported by a market in science
claims qualify as commodity futures trading subject to the CEA?
Here, as in the discussion of gambling law above, a firm answer
proves elusive.  It at least seems safe to say that the intangible
nature of science claims would not alone suffice to remove a mar-
ket in them from the scope of the CEA.  The CEA defines “com-
modities” so broadly as to include “all services, rights, and
interests in which contracts for future delivery are presently or in
the future dealt in.”51
The CFTC might thus argue that a market in science claims
deals in contracts for the future delivery of rights, each such right
embodied in a coupon purchased at a value between $0 and $1
when its associated claim remains unresolved and redeemable at
$0 or $1 when the claim settles.52  The CFTC would arguably err
in that characterization, however.  A more accurate account might
have it that a market in science claims deals in contracts for the
present delivery of rights, as embodied in coupons redeemable at
$1 each in the event a particular claim holds true.53  To put it more
concisely, and no less accurately, a science claim market deals in
the spot purchase and sale of the coupons themselves.
The subtle distinction between those two characterizations
makes a significant legal difference.  As both a matter of policy
and law, the CEA does not cover contracts that settle with the
delivery of the underlying commodity.  The CEA draws the justifi-
cation for its very existence from the notion that buying and sell-
ing contracts for the future delivery of a commodity, rather than
buying and selling commodities intended for actual delivery, in-
vites dangerous speculation.54  In essence, “[a] futures contract en-
ables an investor to hedge the risk that the price of the commodity
tion with a CFTC-regulated exchange); id. § 6c(b) (prohibiting transactions in commodity
futures in violation of CFTC regulations).
51 7 U.S.C. § 1a(4).
52 See discussion supra Part II (describing how decision markets function).
53 One of Robin Hanson’s earliest works on decision markets included, as an illustra-
tive insert, a green coupon payable in the event a nanocomputer having particular specifi-
cations exists by the year 2020. See Hanson, Encouraging an Honest Consensus, supra
note 8.
54 See Lynn A. Stout, Why the Law Hates Speculators: Regulation and Private Order-
ing in the Market for OTC Derivatives, 48 DUKE L.J. 701, 721-24 (1999).
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will change between the date the contract is entered and the date
delivery is due—without having to take physical delivery of the
commodity.”55  The CEA does not cover contracts intended to effec-
tuate future delivery, much less contracts that effectuate immedi-
ate delivery.56
Understood as a forum for dealing in claim coupons, there-
fore, a market in science claims cannot fall within the scope of the
CEA.  The market could easily manage to ensure not only the fu-
ture delivery of claim coupons in satisfaction of participants’ con-
tractual rights, but also the instantaneous delivery of them.  The
market might, for instance, cast coupons in digital form, encrypt
them, and download them immediately to purchasers’ com-
puters.57  “Sell” transactions would function the same way in re-
verse, with sellers uploading the encrypted certificate.  Better yet,
the market could function as a peer-to-peer network wherein cou-
pons transfer directly to and from participants’ computers via the
Internet, without passing through the market’s servers at all.
If that technological account proves unilluminating, it might
help to think of claim coupons as akin to lottery tickets—albeit
tickets for a “lottery” where skill or knowledge predominates over
chance in determining which coupons win58—and the market as a
place where people gather to buy and sell their rights to various
jackpots.  Notably, the CFTC claims no jurisdiction over transac-
tions in lottery tickets.  Nor could the CFTC distinguish between
these cases by claiming that the odds attributed to a science claim
fluctuate, given that a lottery’s odds may vary with the number of
tickets sold.59
Admittedly, this line of argument may sound like the legal
equivalent of a programming hack—a trick designed to fool a sys-
tem into generating unintended or even unwanted results.
Courts, like systems administrators, naturally frown on such ma-
neuvering.  As the Ninth Circuit observed, “[S]elf-serving labels
that the defendants choose to give their contracts should not deter
the conclusion that their contracts, as a matter of law, [are futures
55 Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Noble Metals Int’l, Inc., 67 F.3d 766, 772
(9th Cir. 1995); see also Stout, supra note 54, at 722 (CEA does not apply “to contracts that
are intended to be settled by delivering the underlying good or service.”).
56 7 U.S.C. § 2(a)(1)(A) (specifying that the CFTC has jurisdiction over, in relevant
part, “transactions involving contracts of sale of a commodity for future delivery . . . .”)
(emphasis added).
57 Compare the analogous technologies used by such digital cash services as PayPal
and Javien.  PayPal, at http://www.paypal.com (last visited Mar. 16, 2002); Javien, at http:/
/www.javien.com (last visited Mar. 29, 2002).
58 See supra Part III.A.1 (explaining legal standard for defining gambling
transactions).
59 Lottery services thus often include a disclaimer such as this one from the West
Virginia Powerball Gameshow:  “The odds of winning will vary, depending on the number
of entries received by the Lottery.”  West Virginia Lottery, Powerball The Game Show, at
http://www.state.wv.us/lottery/gameshow.htm (last visited Mar. 16, 2002).
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contracts subject to the CEA].”60  Nonetheless, courts should not
read the CEA expansively.  The Act specifically cautions that it
shall not be “construed as implying . . . that” transactions specifi-
cally excluded from, exempted from, or otherwise not subject to it
“would otherwise be subject to this Act.”61
Suffice it to say that because a market in science claims would
neither operate exactly like nor serve all the same goals as the
markets lawmakers evidently had in mind when they enacted the
CEA,62 it remains an open question whether a court would hold
that a market in science claims falls within the scope of that Act.
It remains a vital question, too.  As the next subsection illustrates,
if markets in science claims do not escape the scope of the Act,
they will almost certainly have to rely on the good will of CFTC
regulators to operate within the bounds of U.S. law.
2. Markets in Science Claims Under the CEA
Suppose for the sake of argument that the sorts of transac-
tions supported by a market in science claims fall within the scope
of the CEA.  Thanks to amendments made by the Commodity Fu-
tures Modernization Act of 2000,63 the CEA now includes loop-
holes that can save even commodities avowedly within its scope
from almost all CFTC regulation.  Most pertinently, the CEA now
leaves almost untouched64 transactions in “excluded” commodities
entered into on a principal-to-principal basis by eligible contract
participants in an electronic trading facility.65  Yet the CEA de-
fines the relevant terms so as to make even that, the most promis-
ing loophole, a problematic fit for markets in science claims.
It appears at least plausible that any of the claims associated
with the coupons traded on a market in science claims would qual-
60 Noble Metals Int’l, 67 F.3d at 773 (quoting Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v.
Am. Metal Exch. Corp., 693 F. Supp. 168, 192 (D.N.J. 1988)) (alteration in original) (inter-
nal quotation omitted).  In the transaction critiqued by the court, the defendants claimed
they had delivered metal to investors by transferring title to it, even though the metal
remained in a third-party depository. Noble Metals Int’l, 67 F.3d at 772-73.  In that case,
there existed a tangible commodity separate from the title. Id.  The intangible nature of
science claims, in contrast, ensures that the commodity (the right to payment contingent on
a claim’s settlement) effectively merges with the title (the coupon documenting the right).
61 7 U.S.C. § 2(i).
62 See Hanson, Decision Markets, supra note 8, at 18 (“Accepted functions of markets
now include entertainment, capitalization, and hedging, but not information aggregation,”
and explaining that information aggregation is the primary function of an idea futures
market.).
63 Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763 (2000).
64 7 U.S.C. § 2(d)(2) requires only that excluded electronic trading facilities satisfy the
applicable requirements of §§ 7a, 7a-1, and 7a-3, which in general call for self-regulatory
processes.
65 Id. § 2(d)(2), (e)(1); see also CHARLES W. EDWARDS ET AL., COMMODITY FUTURES MOD-
ERNIZATION ACT OF 2000: LAW AND EXPLANATION 26-27 (2001).  For the definition of “elec-
tronic trading facility,” see 7 U.S.C. § 1a(10).
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ify as an “excluded commodity” under the CEA,66 whether as an
“index based on . . . values, or levels that are not within the control
of any party to the relevant contract,”67 or as a “contingency . . .
that is—(I) beyond the control of the parties . . . and (II) associated
with a financial, commercial, or economic consequence.”68
Granted, that interpretation stretches the statutory language a
bit because it is not clear that the values of science claims would
constitute indexes under the former provision, or that their values
would be associated with the sorts of consequences specified in the
latter one.69  But commentators have already concluded that com-
modity futures based on weather forecasts—instruments already
in trade70 and not far removed from the sorts of claims in which a
science claims market would traffic—fit the CEA definition.71
Furthermore, CFTC regulations themselves interpret the Act in
terms broad enough to include science claims, explaining that
commodities have:
(i) A nearly inexhaustible deliverable supply;
(ii) A deliverable supply that is sufficiently large that the con-
tract is highly unlikely to be susceptible to the threat of ma-
nipulation; or
(iii) No cash market.72
The first two criteria arguably hold true of a science market claim
because there exists no theoretical limit to the number of opposing
true/false assessments that might attach to any particular claim.73
The first two criteria notwithstanding, the third criterion seems
66 It bears noting that in the rather less likely event that the rights traded on a sci-
ence claims market qualified as commodities subject to the CEA, but not as “excluded com-
modities,” they would certainly qualify as “exempt commodities” under the Act. See 7
U.S.C. § 1a(14) (“The term ‘exempt commodity’ means a commodity that is not an excluded
commodity or an agricultural commodity.”).  Were it found to transact in exempt commodi-
ties, a market in science claims would at best qualify for slightly more stringent regulatory
burdens than it would under the least regulatory approach afforded to excluded commodity
electronic trading facilities. Id. § 2(h)(3)-(5); EDWARDS ET AL., supra note 65, at 28-29.
67 7 U.S.C. § 1a(13)(iii).
68 Id. § 1a(13)(iv).
69 According to one commentator, excluded commodities also impliedly refer to non-
finite processes, Louis Vitale, Comment: Interest Rate Swaps Under the Commodity Ex-
change Act, 51 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 539, 587 (2001), whereas the claims on a science
market, because they would include judging deadlines, would resolve in a finite period.
70 See, e.g., Neela Banerjee, When Bad Weather is Good Business, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13,
2000, § 3, at 4, available at 2000 WL 25031051 (interviewing Ravi Nathan, portfolio man-
ager of weather derivatives at Aquila Energy, regarding nature and uses of weather deriva-
tives); Chicago Mercantile Exchange, Weather Products, at http://www.cme.com/products/
index/weather/products_index_weather.cfm (last visited Jan. 9. 2002) (discussing weather-
based futures traded on the exchange).
71 EDWARDS ET AL., supra note 65, at 26.
72 17 C.F.R. § 37.3(a)(1) (2002); see also id. § 37.3(a)(5) (specifying that commodities
meeting those criteria qualify as “excluded commodities”).
73 See Hanson, Could Gambling Save Science?, supra note 8, at 16-18; Hanson, Vote
on Values, supra note 8, at 22-24 (discussing why idea futures markets resist
manipulation).
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sufficient to bring science claims under the rubric of the CEA be-
cause claim coupons are not the sort of thing you can generally
buy and sell on the open market.
A market in science claims would have to satisfy still other
statutory definitions, however, before it could qualify for the loop-
hole that allows certain transactions in excluded commodities to
largely escape CFTC regulation.  What about those other terms of
art?  The CEA does not define “principal-to-principal,”74 though
common sense and common law would indicate that most transac-
tions on a market in science claims would, or by market rules eas-
ily could, qualify as such because a typical participant—a
professional scientist or educated lay person—would play the
market on his or her own behalf.  A market in science claims
would also easily qualify as an “electronic trading facility” as de-
fined by the Act.75
The problem arises with the definition of “eligible contract
participants,” a label that the CEA generally reserves for financial
institutions, financial professionals, or individuals having at least
five million dollars in assets.76  That describes very few scientists
or educated lay people, yet the success of any market in science
claims would rely on their participation.  The definition of “eligible
contract participants” thus effectively closes the regulatory loop-
hole most promising for markets in science claims.  To put it more
precisely, and to introduce the second means of escaping CFTC
regulation of commodity futures falling within the CEA’s scope, no
scientist or educated lay person would qualify as an eligible con-
tact participant unless the CFTC specially judged him or her “eli-
gible in light of the financial or other qualifications of the
person.”77  The CFTC would no doubt have wide discretion in mak-
ing such a judgment.78
More generally, the CFTC might allow a market subject to its
jurisdiction to engage in futures trading by specially excusing that
market from regulation.79  Unlikely though that option may
sound, the CFTC has in fact established something of a precedent
74 EDWARDS ET AL., supra note 65, at 27.
75 7 U.S.C. § 1a(10) (2001).
76 Id. § 1a(12).
77 Id. § 1a(12)(C).
78 See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44
(1984) (holding that an agency’s interpretation of an ambiguous statute will have control-
ling weight unless manifestly unreasonable).
79 7 U.S.C. § 6(c) (allowing the CFTC to exempt a class of transactions from its regula-
tions on a finding that it would serve the public interest). But see id. § 6(c)(2)(B)(i) (al-
lowing such exemption only for transactions between “appropriate persons”); id. § 6(c)(3)
(defining “appropriate persons” largely to include only financial institutions and profes-
sionals).  Only one loophole arguably allows the CFTC to exempt from its regulations the
sort of science claims market described herein.  Id. § 6(c)(3)(K) (including “other persons
that the Commission determines to be appropriate in light of their financial or other quali-
fications, or the applicability of appropriate regulatory protections”).
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for liberating idea futures markets from its oversight.  The only
real-money idea futures market operating within the reach of U.S.
law, the Iowa Electronic Market, operates by the grace of a no-
action letter received from the CFTC.80  That letter not only saves
the IEM from the running the gantlet of CFTC regulations but
also, thanks to the preemptive force of federal regulation, argua-
bly81 saves the IEM from liability under state gambling or bucket-
shop laws82 that would potentially interfere with the CFTC’s regu-
latory authority.83  To win such benefits, however, the IEM had to
make a concession:  no individual’s account can exceed five hun-
dred dollars.84
Even if the CFTC were willing to issue another such no-action
letter, no market in science claims could accept a five hundred dol-
lars per account cap without losing some of its functionality.  If
the CFTC were willing to impose a less restrictive account limit—
high enough, say, to fund a comfortable living for a renegade but
ultimately correct scientist—a market in science claims might
still fulfill much of its promise, of course.85  If the CFTC were fur-
thermore willing to forego blunt account caps for the more tradi-
80 IEM, Is It Legal?, supra note 24 (“The CFTC has issued a ‘no-action’ letter to the
IEM, stating that as long as the IEM conforms to certain guidelines, the CFTC will take no
action against it.”).
81 In fact, neither the CFTC nor the IEM expressly claims that the no-action letter
preempts state law, and the precise legal question appears to remain unresolved.  Practi-
cally speaking, though, state prosecutors and regulators have left the IEM in peace.
82 See Kevin T. Van Wart, Preemption and the Commodity Exchange Act, 58 CHI.-
KENT. L. REV. 657, 659 n.15 (1982) (“The term ‘bucket shop’ refers to firms that offer cus-
tomers the opportunity to bet on changes in futures market prices without actually enter-
ing into futures transactions on the contract market.”).
83 See Am. Agric. Movement, Inc. v. Board of Trade, 977 F.2d 1147, 1157 (7th Cir.
1992) (“State laws specifically directed towards the futures markets naturally operate in an
arena preempted by the CEA.”); Rasmussen v. Thomson & McKinnon Auchincloss Kohl-
meyer, Inc., 608 F.2d 175, 178 (5th Cir. 1979) (“[T]he Commodity Exchange Act preempts
all state laws inconsistent with its provisions.”); Thomas Lee Hazen, Rational Investments,
Speculation, or Gambling?—Derivative Securities and Financial Futures and Their Effect
on the Underlying Capital Markets, 86 NW. U.L. REV. 987, 1013-17 (1992); Van Wart, supra
note 82, at 720 (“Congress has vested solely in the CFTC both authority to determine
whether to designate a contract market for a proposed future, and exclusive jurisdiction for
the regulation of such markets after their designation.”); id. at 662-63 (discussing how,
before the advent of federal preemption, states’ “bucket shop” laws restricted the operation
of futures markets).
For a preemption provision only very recently added to the CEA, and especially suita-
ble for a science claims market capable of benefiting from the “excluded commodity” loop-
hole, discussed supra, see 7 U.S.C. § 16(e)(2) (“This Act shall supersede and preempt the
application of any State or local law that prohibits or regulates gaming or the operation of
bucket shops (other than antifraud provisions of general applicability) in the case of . . . an
agreement, contract, or transaction that is excluded from this Act . . . .”) (citation omitted).
84 See IEM, Applying for an Account, supra note 22 (“The minimum investment for
U.S. Dollar denominated accounts is $5.00 and the maximum is $500 per account.  Invest-
ments may be increased at any time, provided they do not exceed the maximum $500 limit
. . . .”).
85 Its hedging functions might suffer, however.  If account limits were set at one hun-
dred thousand dollars, for instance, an insurer could hardly buy claims payable in the
event of global warming as a hedge against the losses caused by rising sea levels.
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tional and subtle tools of position limits (which restrict the size of
any trader’s stake in a particular contract),86 or trading limits
(which restrict the size of particular transactions),87 a market in
science claims might operate still more effectively.  Thanks to the
Chevron doctrine88 and the CEA’s broad language about such mat-
ters,89 however, the CFTC would have near-absolute discretion to
give a market in science claims as little leeway as it gave to the
IEM—or even less.
In summary, a freestanding market in science futures would
face several options, each legally uncertain and none without risk,
for accommodating U.S. commodity futures regulations.  First,
proponents of a market in science futures might successfully ar-
gue that it does not engage in commodity futures trading, at least
not the kind covered by the CEA.  In that event, the market would
not win CEA’s protective preemption of state laws, such as those
criminalizing or regulating gambling.  Second, should a market in
science claims find itself subject to the CEA, it could attempt to
qualify for the “excluded commodity” loophole that would largely
free it from CFTC regulation.  It looks highly probable, however,
that the CFTC would have wide discretion to thwart any such at-
tempt.  At the least, to judge from precedent, the CFTC would
probably not exclude a market in science claims from its regula-
tions without also imposing crippling conditions.  That makes the
third option—seeking a no-action letter from the CFTC—similarly
unattractive.
3. Listing Science Claims on an Existing Market
Although markets in science claims may very well have
trouble meeting the CEA’s requirements if they fall within the
scope of that Act, science claims themselves might not face the
same difficulty.  The claims would have to find a new home, how-
ever, on a market already approved by the CFTC.  Of the five
types of exchanges defined by the CEA,90 registered derivatives
transaction execution facilities (DTEFs)91 appear most suitable for
hosting science claims.
86 See 7 U.S.C. § 6(a).
87 Id.
88 See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44
(1984) (holding that an agency’s interpretation of an ambiguous statute will have control-
ling weight unless manifestly unreasonable).
89 See 7 U.S.C. § 6(c)(1) (“In order to promote responsible economic or financial inno-
vation and fair competition, the Commission . . . may . . . exempt any agreement, contract,
or transaction (or class thereof)” from most of the requirements of the CEA.).
90 EDWARDS ET AL., supra note 65, at 21.
91 7 U.S.C. § 7a (establishing DTEFs); see also EDWARDS ET AL., supra note 65, at 31-
33 (discussing DTEFs).  In general terms, because DTEFs host trading only in contracts
that resist manipulation, they operate under comparatively little CFTC oversight.
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The Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000 recently
amended the CEA to give trading facilities broad discretion in the
types of claims they issue.92  Essentially, when a DTEF submits a
new contract for approval,93 the regulations deem the contract ap-
proved unless the CFTC objects to it as not conforming to CEA
standards.94  What standards would the CEA apply to such con-
tracts? The same standards (among others) already applied
above95 in explaining why science claims qualify as “excluded com-
modities”:  the underlying commodity may have a nearly inex-
haustible deliverable supply, a supply so large as to render the
contract highly resistant to manipulation, or no cash market.96
The Act also separately provides that DTEFs can elect to transact
in excluded commodities.97  It thus looks likely that DTEFs could
support trading in science claims.
This is not to say that most people would be able to partici-
pate directly in science claims hosted on DTEFs.  Direct partici-
pants would in general have to qualify as “eligible traders,” a term
that would fit very few of the people from whom a market in sci-
ence claims would need input in order to fulfill its potential.98  By
working through a futures commission merchant, however, profes-
sional scientists and educated lay people could indirectly win ac-
cess to science claims trading on a DTEF.99
Would a DTEF have any interest in issuing science claims?
Such markets exist100 to make money, after all, and it does not
appear extraordinarily likely that the transaction fees charged for
trading in science claims would generate a great deal of reve-
nue.101  Still, it might generate enough positive public relations to
justify some costs, and benefactors interested in promoting science
claims might help out as well.  Here, as with regard to markets
generally, we can only guess what services parties would find
worth their while to sell.
92 See EDWARDS ET AL., supra note 65, at 21.
93 A “contract” in this context represents the very thing traded on the DTEF:  a con-
tract for the payment of a particular sum contingent on a particular condition.  It should
thus call to mind the coupons traded on a market in science claims.
94 See 7 U.S.C. § 7a-2(c)-(d); 17 C.F.R. § 40.3 (2001).
95 See discussion supra Part III.B.2.
96 7 U.S.C. § 7a(b) (describing requirements for contracts traded on a DTEFs).
97 Id. § 7a(g).
98 Id. § 7a(b)(3); see also id. § 1a(12) (defining “eligible contract participant”).
99 Id. § 7a(b)(3)(B); see also id. § 1a(20) (defining “futures commission merchant”).  Re-
lying on agents such as futures commission merchants would plainly disqualify a science
claims market from the loophole discussed, supra, in Part III.B.2, as that loophole requires
principal-to-principal transactions.
100 Or, more precisely, would exist; at present, no DTEFs exist.  CFTC.gov, Table of
Registered DTEFs, at http://www.cftc.gov/dea/deadtefs_table.htm (last visited Jan. 25,
2002).
101 Markets in science claims appear unlikely, after all, to generate the sort of trading
volume generated by for-profit commodities futures markets.
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IV. ALTERNATIVES TO FULLY PUBLIC AND LEGAL
SCIENCE MARKETS
As the above analysis suggests, it will not be easy for a mar-
ket in science claims to win clearly legal status under U.S. law.
No discussion of the legality of such markets would be complete,
however, without at least a brief mention of a few more subtle, if
sometimes less legal, approaches to the problem.  This Part con-
siders three such strategies, each having a lower cost-to-risk ratio
than the next.
At the high end of the cost-to-risk spectrum falls the strategy
of keeping a science claims market wholly in-house, open only to
the members of a commercial firm.  Hewlett-Packard, for instance,
has found that internal idea futures markets consistently beat of-
ficial forecasts at predicting printer sales.102  Siemens has experi-
mented with similar markets,103 and the Department of Defense
has invited proposals for the development of limited-access fu-
tures markets for its use.104  The law appears to regard such mar-
kets as purely private affairs, not subject to the regulatory
burdens that might attach if the public could participate in
them.105  They thus pose little legal risk.  A market in science
claims would probably not achieve its potential unless it were
open to a very large variety and number of participants, however,
and to try to bring them all within the bounds of a private firm
would probably not prove cost-effective.
As an alternative presenting a more moderate cost-to-risk ra-
tio, Internet gambling sites based offshore could host and offer
public access to markets in science claims.  That option presents
more peril in theory than in actuality, as U.S. law can neither ef-
fectively regulate overseas gambling sites nor bar U.S. citizens
from patronizing them.106  It remains doubtful, however, that op-
erating out of such sites would serve science markets very well.  It
may sound encouraging that Internet-based bookmakers have al-
102 Hanson, Vote on Values, supra note 8, at 11.
103 Hanson, Decision Markets, supra note 8, at 19.
104 See Small Business Innovation Research, Department of Defense, Defense Ad-
vanced Research Projects Agency Submission of Proposals, DARPA SB012-012: Electronic
Market-Based Decision Support, at http://www.acq.osd.mil/sadbu/sbir/solicitations/sbir012/
pdf/darpa012.pdf (last modified Apr. 30, 2001) (requesting submissions for proposals to
“[d]evelop electronic market-based methods and software for decision analysis, to aggre-
gate information and opinions from groups of experts,” and to identify “a group of knowl-
edgeable market participants . . . .”).
105 See, e.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17539.3(a) (West 2001) (stating that certain
statutes regulating the offer of betting to the public “shall not apply to a game conducted to
promote the sale of an employer’s product or service by his employees, when those employ-
ees are the sole eligible participants”).
106 See TOM W. BELL, INTERNET GAMBLING: POPULAR, INEXORABLE, AND (EVENTUALLY)
LEGAL 2 (Cato Policy Analysis No. 336, Mar. 8, 1999).
2002] Gambling for the Good, Trading for the Future 179
ready offered bets on unconventional topics like political races107
and the likelihood of aliens landing in Washington, D.C.108  Never-
theless, a bookmaking service cannot duplicate markets in science
claims because it typically relies on a bookmaker, rather than the
interplay of market participants, to set the odds on a claim.109
Bookmakers consequently avoid carefully estimating the odds on
difficult and obscure scientific disputes, preferring to set safe odds
on flashy and amusing claims likely to draw in customers who will
migrate to sports betting.110  It may also prove true that demand
for online versions of more conventional types of gambling would
make running a market in science claims relatively unprofitable
for Internet bookmakers and casinos.  At any rate, given that a
market in science claims touts as one of its main benefits the dis-
semination of soberly accurate measures of experts’ consensus
views on matters of pressing concern, having the market located
in the Internet equivalent of the Las Vegas strip threatens to
largely defeat its purpose.
At the low end of the cost-to-risk spectrum, a market in sci-
ence claims could ignore the legal uncertainties and simply charge
ahead, trusting that authorities would not notice, not care, or at
least not succeed in convincing a court that so well-intentioned a
project ought to give rise to civil or criminal liability. That strat-
egy could prove either a heroic success or a foolhardy failure.  It
has not gone completely untried, however.  Perhaps showing how
much advocates of a market in science claims want to get one up
and running, they have indeed flown one under the law’s radar.
Though documentary proof naturally remains somewhat scanty,
the tax-exempt Foresight Institute111 for some time test-ran a
real-money idea futures market accessible only to its high-level
donors.112  It recently discontinued that experiment, however, and
has now focused its research on ways of making a similar market
available to the public at large.113  At present, it does not look
likely that anyone in the United States will attempt the still more
risky scheme of publicly launching a full-blown, real-money mar-
ket in science claims.
107 See, for example, the bets offered by the Antigua-based Intertops website. In-
tertops.com, Betting, Politics, at http://www.intertops.com/sportsbook/cgi-win-2/
itwww.exe? (last visited Jan. 10, 2002).
108 See Leander Kahney, Y2K Disaster? You can Bet on It, WIRED NEWS, Sept. 27, 1999,
available at http://www.wired.com/news/news/culture/story/21946.html.
109 Hanson, Could Gambling Save Science?, supra note 8, at 20-21.
110 Id.
111 See Foresight Institute, at http://www.foresight.org (last visited Jan. 19, 2002).
Notwithstanding the similarity of their names, the Foresight Institute and the Foresight
Exchange, discussed supra Part II, have no formal ties.
112 Trustworthy people closely involved with the Foresight Institute have spoken to me
of such a market and have given me qualified permission to mention their work here.
113 Correspondence is on file with the author.
180 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 5:159
V. CONCLUSION
Advocates of markets in science claims should take heed but
take heart.  The brightest prospect for such markets winning fully
legal status under U.S. law—qualifying them as neither a form of
illegal gambling nor as commodity futures trading subject to the
scope of the CEA—looks quite bright, indeed.  A market in science
claims could then set up operations on U.S. soil with no more reg-
ulatory worries than those that typically come with the start-up of
a for-profit business or tax-exempt organization.  At present,
though, with a dearth of controlling cases or clearly applicable
statutes, it remains uncertain whether a market in science claims
would enjoy so easy a path to legal respectability.  Persuading an
exchange already regulated by the CFTC to issue science claims
thus offers an attractive, if perhaps expensive, alternative.
Those two approaches—aiming for the legal gap between
gambling and commodity futures trading or taking regulatory
shelter under an existing commodity futures exchange—offer the
most obvious routes toward making markets in science claims
fully operational in the United States.  They do not offer the only
routes toward that end, however, as there remain somewhat less
attractive, because somewhat less than fully legal, alternatives.
Given all the ways to work with or around the law, and the funda-
mentally sound policy reasons for doing so, it seems worthwhile
and realistic to aim at putting the theory of markets for science
claims into practice.  When good ideas find no outlet in lawful
acts, after all, good acts can change our ideas about the law.
